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Abstract
In this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic diﬀerential game with an
inﬁnite planning horizon for descriptor systems of index one. The performance function is assumed
to be indeﬁnite. We derive both necessary and suﬃcient conditions under which this game has a
Nash equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, there is an increased interest in studying diverse problems in economics and
optimal control theory using dynamic games. In particular in environmental economics and macroe-
conomic policy coordination, dynamic games are a natural framework to model policy coordination
problems (see e.g. the books and references in Dockner et al. [8], Jørgensen et al. [22], Plasmans et
al. [32] and Grass et al. [19]). Moreover, in optimal control theory it is well-known that, e.g., the
issue to obtain robust control strategies can be approached as a dynamic game problem (see e.g. [2],
[26] and [5]).
In this paper we consider the linear quadratic diﬀerential game under the assumption that the
dynamics of the underlying process are described by a descriptor system. That is, by both a set
of diﬀerential equations and linear equations. Problems of this kind appear in studying systems
which operate under diﬀerent timescales like e.g. in mechanical engineering where an electrically
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1driven robot manipulator typically has slow mechanical dynamics and fast electrical dynamics, or in
environmental economics where global warming is assumed to be a system which has slow dynamics
that is aﬀected by various processes that have fast dynamics. They also sometimes naturally appear
in modeling systems like e.g. the Leontieﬀ model in economics describing the relationship between
the levels of production of a number of interrelated production sectors. See e.g. [27], [21] or [20] and
the references therein.
The ”one-player” regulator problem for descriptor systems that have index one has been consid-
ered by many authors. One of the ﬁrst who considered this control problem was Pandolﬁ [30]. His
results were later on generalized by e.g. Cobb [7] who gave both necessary and suﬃcient conditions
under which the regular deﬁnite control problem has a solution in terms of a transformed system.
In the seminal paper [4] Bender and Laub show, amongst other things, by considering the stable
eigenspace of a generalized eigenvalue problem that the (generally non-unique) optimal feedback
gains are constrained to lie in a linear variety, all of which yield the same minimal cost of (1). Un-
fortunately, however, this approach does not render itself to be generalized to a multi-player context
with a feedback information structure. In [12] an explicit characterization was obtained for this
set of optimal feedback gains in terms of a transformed system, which make it possible to extend
results for a multi-player context. The reason to consider index one descriptor systems is that, see
e.g. [17] (or references cited there), for all initial states of the system there exists a smooth control
that generates a smooth state trajectory if and only if the system is controllable at inﬁnity (or,
impulse controllable). Further, all impulsive modes of the system can be transformed then into ﬁnite
dynamic modes using a static state feedback control. After this transformation the system has then
the property of being of index one (which will be formally introduced in section 2). Since we do not
want to consider impulsive control actions in this paper we will therefore restrict our attention to
impulse controllable systems, or without loss of generality, to systems that are of index one.
In this note we consider the linear quadratic diﬀerential game under a feedback information struc-
ture. The reason to consider this information structure is that the corresponding linear feedback Nash
equilibria (FBNE) have the nice property of strong time consistency. A property which, e.g., does
not hold under an open-loop information structure.
The case that the system is just described by a set of diﬀerential equations has been considered
by many authors and dates back to the seminal work of Starr and Ho in [33]. For the ﬁxed ﬁnite
planning horizon, one can show that there exists at most one FBNE (see e.g. [28], [31]). For the
inﬁnite planning horizon it is well-known that the problem may have up to an inﬁnite number of
FBNE. References and related issues can be found in, e.g., [3] and [9].
For descriptor systems having an open-loop information structure in [10] the general multi-person
game problem for index one systems was solved. Further, in [11] some ﬁrst results were obtained for
higher order index systems.
Probably the ﬁrst reference where in fact descriptor systems were considered with a feedback
information structure within the context of singularly perturbed systems is [16] (see also [15] for
the zero-sum case). For descriptor systems with a closed-loop perfect state information structure
Xu and Mizukami [34] derived for a ﬁnite planning horizon some ﬁrst results for zero-sum games.
Further, these authors considered the leader-follower information structure in [29] and [35]. Glizer [18]
considered the asymptotic behavior of the zero-sum game solution from a cheap control perspective.
As already mentioned above Engwerda et al. [12] solved the general multi-person game problem
where the solvability conditions are posed in terms of a transformed system. However, the results
2were obtained under the simplifying assumption that the state cost are nonnegative. In particular this
implies that the results obtained there are not directly applicable to a zero-sum game setting. In this
paper we generalize these feedback results for performance criteria that also include ”cross-terms”,
i.e. products of the state and control variables and with no deﬁniteness assumptions concerning the
involved state cost. We provide a complete parametrization of all Nash solutions. As a special case
we derive existence results for the zero-sum game. Performance criteria of this type often naturally
appear in economic policy making.
The outline of this note is as follows. Section two introduces the problem and contains some
preliminary results. The main results of this paper are stated in Section three, whereas Section
four illustrates the presented theory with an example. The ﬁnal section contains some concluding
remarks.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper we assume that player i = 1,2 likes to minimize:
lim
tf→∞


























, Rii > 0, i = 1,2, and x(t) satisﬁes the linear diﬀerential equation
E ˙ x(t) = Ax(t) + B1u1(t) + B2u2(t), x(0) = x0. (2)
Notice that we make no deﬁniteness assumptions w.r.t. matrix Qi.
Next, we recall some standard deﬁnitions and results concerning descriptor systems. Consider
the system
E ˙ x(t) = Ax(t), x(0) = x0, (3)
where rank(E) = r < n. An initial state x0 in (3) is called consistent if with this choice of the initial
state the system has a solution. Let λ be any complex number. Then, system (3) (or the matrix pair
(E,A)) is called regular if det(λE − A)  = 0. System (3) has a unique solution, for any consistent
initial state, if and only if (E,A) is regular.
The solutions of |λE − A| = 0 are called the ﬁnite eigenvalues of (E,A), and the corresponding
(generalized) eigenvectors are exponential modes of the system. From [14] we recall the so-called
Weierstrass canonical form.














where A1 is a matrix in Jordan form, N is a nilpotent matrix also in Jordan form and I is the
identity matrix. A1 and N are unique up to permutation of Jordan blocks. ￿
3From (4) we have that λE−A = Y −T diag{λI−A1,λN−I}X−1. Since λN−I = −λ( I−N),   = λ−1
and N is nilpotent, one says that λN−I describes the eigenstructure at ∞ (or the inﬁnite eigenvalues)
of the pencil λE − A. Notice that in case we consider the system
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where ǫ > 0 and N  = 0, there exist initial states that grow arbitrarily fast in time if ǫ → 0. Moreover,





and x2(0) = [1 0]T, we observe that the solution of the
second part of the system has to jump to x2(t) = [0 0]T, for all t > 0. For these reasons system (3)
is said to create impulsive modes if there exist generalized eigenvectors, xk, satisfying the relations
Ex1 = 0 and Exk = xk−1(k ≥ 2). System (3) has no impulsive modes if and only if N = 0 or,
equivalently, rank E = deg |λE − A|. Further, system (3) is said to be of index one1 if N = 0
(its degree of nilpotency is one). Next recall from, e.g., [17] that for all initial states in (2) there
exists a smooth control that generates a smooth state trajectory if and only if (2) is controllable at
inﬁnity (or, impulse controllable2). Further, all impulsive modes of (2) can be transformed then into
ﬁnite dynamic modes using static state feedback control. Since we do not want to consider impulsive
control actions in this paper we restrict our attention to impulse controllable systems. As we consider
the state feedback control problem this motivates why we may assume for our problem, without loss
of generality, that the matrix pair (E,A) in (2) is index one.






−1x, where x1 ∈ I R
r and x2 ∈ I R
n−r (6)








































































Of course problem (7,8) is not completely speciﬁed, as we did not specify the set of admissible feedback
strategies yet and neither paid attention to the fact that not for every initial state a solution exists
of (8). The set of all consistent initial states of (3) is given by {x0 | x0 = X[¯ xT
1 0]T, ¯ x1 ∈ I Rr}.
As shown in [24] this set does not depend on the choice of matrix X that is chosen in (4). In the
sequel we will assume that if x0 = X[¯ xT
1 ¯ xT
2]T is an inconsistent initial state of (4), the system’s
state will jump to x
+
0 := X[¯ xT
1 0]T. This assumption is motivated by the idea that the part of the
state of the system that is governed by the fast dynamics of the system can, compared to the part
1This is equivalent (see e.g. [25]) to the assumption that rank([E AW]) = n, where the image of matrix W equals
the null space of E. Notice furthermore that in that case |λE − A| is not a constant.
2System (2) is impulse controllable (see e.g. [25]) if and only if rank[E AW B] = n.
4of the state governed by the slow dynamics, easily adapt. We will restrict the analysis to the set of
linear state feedback controls that stabilize the system for all consistent initial states. A necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the existence of such a stabilizing feedback matrix is that system (2) (or
(E,A,B), where B = [B1 B2]) is ﬁnite dynamics stabilizable3. This property holds if and only if
rank [λE −A B] = n for all λ ∈ l C
+
0
4. These requirements lead then to the assumption that F ∈ F,
where





T | all ﬁnite eigenvalues of (E,A + BF) are stable and (E,A + BF) has index one}.
We assume that the matrix pairs (A1,Bi1), i = 1,2, are stabilizable. So, in principle, each player
is capable to stabilize the ﬁrst part of the transformed system on his own. Notice furthermore from
the above discussion (and the fact that for any ﬁxed matrix F ∈ F, matrix G := I + [B12 B22]FX2
is invertible (see Lemma 2.3 below)) that for a ﬁxed F ∈ F the set of consistent initial states for (8)
equals {(x1(0),x2(0)) | x2(0) = G−1[B12 B22]FX1x1(0), x1(0) ∈ I Rr}.
Notice that the assumption that the players use simultaneously stabilizing controls introduces
the cooperative meta-objective of both players to stabilize the system (see e.g. [9] for a discussion).
Then, u∗ := (u∗
1,u∗
2) ∈ F is called a feedback Nash equilibrium if the usual inequalities apply, i.e.,
no player can improve his performance by a unilateral deviation from this set of equilibrium actions.
Introducing the notation u∗
−i(α) := u∗ where u∗
i has been replaced by the arbitrary input function α
the formal deﬁnition reads as follows




2) ∈ F is called a feedback Nash equilibrium (FBN) if for i = 1,2,
Ji(x0,u∗) ≤ Ji(x0,u∗
−i(α)) for every x0 and input α such that u∗
−i(α) ∈ F. ￿
So, summarizing, the main problem addressed in this paper reads as follows.
Problem 1: Consider the performance criterion (1) and system (2), where rank(E) = r < n =
dim(x). Assume (E,A) is regular and has index one; and (E,A,B) is ﬁnite dynamics stabilizable.
Let X be as deﬁned in (4). Decompose X =: [X1 X2], with X1 ∈ I Rn×r and X2 ∈ I Rn×(n−r)
Find conditions under which (1,2) has a FBN solution ui = Fix, with F ∈ F. ￿
To solve Problem 1 we ﬁrst state some preliminary results. The following Lemma 2.3 can be found
in [12].
Lemma 2.3 Assume (E,A + BF) is regular and has index one. Then for all F ∈ F, G := I +
[B12 B22]FX2 is invertible.
Furthermore we recall from, e.g., [6, p.97] the following property.
Lemma 2.4 Assume C ∈ I Rn×m and D ∈ I Rm×n. Then the following holds:
1. In + CD is invertible if and only if Im + DC is invertible.
2. If In + CD is invertible then: C(Im + DC)−1 = (In + CD)−1C. ￿
3(2) is ﬁnite dynamics stabilizable if there exists a feedback u(t) = Fx(t) such that all ﬁnite eigenvalues of the
system E ˙ x(t) = (A + BF)x(t) are stable.
4 l C
+
0 is the set of complex numbers with non-negative real part.
5The following lemma can be proved directly from the deﬁnition of Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2.5 (F ∗
1,F ∗
2) is a FBN for the game deﬁned by the cost Ji(F1H,F2H) and the system ˙ x(t) =
(A + B1F1H + B2F2H)x(t), x(0) = x0 if and only if (G∗
1,G∗
2) is a FBN for the game deﬁned by the
cost Ji(G1,G2) and the system ˙ x(t) = (A + B1G1 + B2G2)x(t), x(0) = x0 and (F ∗
1,F ∗
2) solve the set
of equations F ∗
1H = G∗
1 and F ∗
2H = G∗
2. ￿
Finally, we recall from [13] the following result.






is invertible. Then the diﬀerential game (1,2),









1 K1 + V T
1
BT




Here (K1,K2) are a symmetric stabilizing solution of the coupled algebraic Riccati equations
0 = (A + B2F2)
TK1 + K1(A + B2F2) − F
T
1 R11F1 + F
T




1 + W1F2 + Q1 (10)
0 = (A + B1F1)
TK2 + K2(A + B1F1) − F
T
2 R22F2 + F
T




2 + V2F1 + Q2. (11)
￿
3 Main results
To solve Problem 1 we ﬁrst notice from (8), using Lemma 2.3, and our jump assumption on incon-
sistent initial states, that for all t > 0
x2 = Hx1, where H := −(I + [B12 B22]FX2)
−1[B12 B22]FX1. (12)
Substitution of this into (7,8) shows that Problem 1 has a FBNE if and only if (F1,F2) is a FBNE
















































x1(t), x1(0) = [I 0]X
−1x0. (14)

















































A1 + [B11 B21]
  ˜ F1
˜ F2
  
x1(t), x1(0) = [I 0]X
−1x0. (16)
Next notice that, by Lemma 2.4,
H = −(I + [B12 B22]FX2)
−1[B12 B22]FX1 = −[B12 B22]F(I + X2[B12 B22]F)
−1X1
= −(B12 ˜ F1 + B22 ˜ F2). (17)























































˜ Qi ˜ Vi ˜ Wi
˜ V T






We now have the following result.
Theorem 3.1 Assume that matrix ˜ G :=




is invertible and the matrices ˜ Rii > 0, i =
1,2.
Then (F1,F2) is a FBN for (1,2) for every initial state if and only if
Fi = ˜ FiP
+ + Zi(I − PP
+), where Zi ∈ I R
mi×n, P = X
 
I
−B12 ˜ F1 − B22 ˜ F2
 
(19)
and ( ˜ F1, ˜ F2) are given by
  ˜ F1
˜ F2
 




11K1 + ˜ V T
1
BT




where (K1,K2) are a symmetric stabilizing solution of the coupled algebraic Riccati equations
0 = (A1 + B21 ˜ F2)
TK1 + K1(A1 + B21 ˜ F2) − ˜ F
T
1 ˜ R11 ˜ F1 + ˜ F
T




1 + ˜ W1 ˜ F2 + ˜ Q1 (21)
0 = (A1 + B11 ˜ F1)
TK2 + K2(A1 + B11 ˜ F1) − ˜ F
T
2 ˜ R22 ˜ F2 + ˜ F
T




2 + ˜ V2 ˜ F1 + ˜ Q2. (22)
Moreover, Ji = xT
0 X−T[I 0]TKi[I 0]X−1x0. ￿
7Proof: From the above reformulation it follows directly from Lemma 2.5 that (F1,F2) is a FBN for
(1,2) for every initial state if and only if ( ˜ F1, ˜ F2) is a FBN for the game deﬁned by the cost (18) and





. From, e.g. [1, p.295], we have
that this equation always has a solution and that all solutions are parameterized by (19). Further,
by Theorem 2.6 we have that ( ˜ F1, ˜ F2) is a FBN for every initial state for the game deﬁned by the cost
(18) and system (16) if and only if (20) holds where (K1,K2) are a stabilizing solution of (21,22). ￿
Remark 3.2 Notice that since matrix X is invertible and
 
I
−B12 ˜ F1 − B22 ˜ F2
 
is full column rank,















−B12 ˜ F1 − B22 ˜ F2
  −1




Remark 3.3 For the zero-sum game, i.e. J1 = −J2, we obtain by addition of (21) and (22) (followed
by some elementary rewriting) that Ki satisfy the equation
A
T
cl(K1 + K2) + (K1 + K2)Acl = 0,
where Acl is the stable closed-loop matrix A1 + B11 ˜ F1 + B21 ˜ F2. Since Acl is a stable matrix it
follows from this linear matrix equation that necessarily K1 + K2 = 0. So we have that K2 = −K1.
Substitution of this into (21) and (22) shows that these equations have a stabilizing solution if and
only if the equation
A
T
1K1 + K1A1 + ˜ Q1 − [˜ V1 + K1B11 ˜ W1 + K1B21] ˜ G
−1[˜ V1 + K1B11 − ( ˜ W1 + K1B21)]
T = 0 (23)
has a solution K1 such that σ(A1 − [B11 B21] ˜ G−1
  ˜ V T
1 + BT
11K1




) ⊂ l C−. Notice that ˜ G =




. Since ˜ R11 is invertible one can use, e.g., the expression for the inverse of a block




[˜ V1 + K1B11 ˜ W1 + K1B21] ˜ G−1
  ˜ V T
1 + BT
11K1





= [˜ V1 + K1B11 ˜ W1 + K1B21]
  ˜ Ginv





   ˜ V T
1 + BT
11K1




= [˜ V1 + K1B11 ˜ W1 + K1B21]




21 − ˜ Ginv
22







8is clearly symmetric too.
So (23) is an ordinary Riccati equation, which we know has at most one stabilizing solution. There-
fore, if the zero-sum game has a solution, then the equilibrium actions ( ˜ F1, ˜ F2) are unique and given
by
  ˜ F1
˜ F2
 




11K1 + ˜ V T
1
−(BT




So from (19) we have that the set of equilibrium strategies for the zero-sum game (1,2) is
( ˜ F1P
+ + Z1(I − PP
+), ˜ F2P
+ + Z2(I − PP
+)),
where Zi ∈ I Rmi×n and P = X
 
I
−B12 ˜ F1 − B22 ˜ F2
 
. ￿
Remark 3.4 [16] considered convergence of the feedback Nash solution of the singularly perturbed
system
˙ x1(t) = x1(t) + 2x2(t) + u1(t) + u2(t); x1(0) = x1(0);
















i (t)Riiui(t) + u
T






, Rii = 1, Rij = 2. In this example the converged (symmetric) feedback Nash
equilibrium strategies, i.e. F ∗
i = limǫ↓0 Fi(ǫ) = −[1.5908 0.7321], i = 1,2.












the transformed system parameters if ǫ = 0 (cf. (8,18))
are A1 = 0, Bi1 = 3, Bi2 = 1, ˜ Qi = 3
2, ˜ Vi = 0, ˜ Wi = 0, ˜ Rii = 3, ˜ Rij = 4, j  = i, and ˜ Ni = 2, i = 1,2.



















3 1], i = 1,2; −0.4906 < λ1 + λ2 < 1.1966.
It is easily veriﬁed that F ∗
i does not belong to this class of FBN solutions.
So, this example demonstrates that in general the FBN strategies of the singularly perturbed system
do not converge to a FBN strategy of the corresponding reduced order system. This, though the fast
dynamics in the singularly perturbed system are stable (i.e. A22 = −2 < 0).
The example presented below in Section 4 shows that there are also cases where, independent of the
stability properties of the fast dynamics, always convergence occurs. ￿
94 An Example
In this section we illustrate the obtained results in a small example. We consider the following
dynamic equations
˙ f(t) = βf(t) − p(t) − u1(t); f(0) = f0 (24)
















The example might be interpreted along the following lines. Consider a ranger who has to take care
about the ﬁsh stock in a lake. The lake is fed by a river. Upstream the river there is a ﬁrm who wants
to dump some of its waste into the river. The waste, however, has the property that it contains a
product which spreads quickly in the water and from which cause the ﬁsh to die. Both the ranger
and the ﬁrm know this. The ﬁrm has a license to dump some of its waste into the river provided
the pollution is not getting too excessive in the sense that the ﬁsh stock will get below its natural
equilibrium value (which is set to 0 here for ease of calculations). In the above model the ﬁsh stock
(above its natural equilibrium value) is represented by the variable f, the ﬁshing by the ranger by u1
(a negative value can be interpreted as planting ﬁsh into the lake), the waste dropped into the river
by u2 (a negative value can be interpreted as eﬀorts undertaken by the ﬁrm to clean the river again)
and p the amount of pollution. It is assumed that the negative eﬀect of pollution on the growth of
the ﬁsh stock is proportional to p. The ranger is paid for the number of hours he spends on keeping
the ﬁsh stock of the lake near its equilibrium value. The quadratic structure of the revenues for the
ranger could be motivated by the fact that if the ﬁsh stock is far from its equilibrium it will cost him
much more time to ﬁx everything again.
Introducing xT(t) := [f(t) p(t)], we can rewrite the above model (24,25) as







































−τf 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0









0 0 0 0
0 −τp 0 0
0 0 0 0














































Figure 1: The set of feedback matrices (19) for the Example.
It is easily veriﬁed that (E,A + BF) has index one iﬀ., with F2 := [f21f22], f22  = −α. Furthermore




























α2˜ τp < 0, we get that




















, where ki solve the equations














Notice if matrix P = [−α
−k2
α˜ τp ]T in (19) is denoted by [p1 p2]T, matrix P + = 1
p2
1+p2
2[p1 p2]. So, matrix

































That is, geometrically, all equilibrium feedback matrices Fi are located on a line through ˜ FiP +
which is perpendicular to the line λP, λ ∈ I R. We illustrate this in Figure 1. In the Appendix it
is shown that depending on the choice of parameters either zero up to three diﬀerent equilibria can
occur.
In the rest of this example we will concentrate on the case that τf = β2, where just one equilibrium




3 ) solve (29)




3 ] and the cost are J1 = −
β
3f2
0 and J2 = 8
3β˜ τpf2
0.
11From (30) it follows then that
F1 = [0
−1
8 ] + λ1[
−8
3 β 1] and F2 = [0 − α] + λ2[
−8
3 β 1], with λ2  = 0. (31)
So the closed-loop dynamics, using this choice of Fi, are determined by an initial amount of pollution




3βf0 followed by a decline of pollution and a return to its natural equilibrium
of the ﬁsh stock along the trajectories p(t) = 8
3βf(t), where f(t) = e
−4
3tf0.
In the Appendix also the feedback Nash equilibria are determined in case ǫ  = 0. In particular
it is shown there that the corresponding equilibrium costs coincide with the above formulae in the
limiting case (ǫ ↓ 0). Furthermore the limiting equilibrium actions are obtained by choosing λ1 = 1
8
and λ2 = −
 
˜ τp in (31) above. So, the ranger will be just planting ﬁsh in this equilibrium and
the ﬁrm’s dumping of waste depends positively on the ﬁsh stock and negatively on the amount of
pollution.
To analyze the question which choice of λi in (31) might provide some additional robustness
properties, we next consider the cost if one uses the equilibrium actions Fi from (31) to control
system (24,25) if ǫ  = 0. Then the system dynamics are described by




































Notice that this system is stable iﬀ λ2 < 0 and
λ2
ǫ + β(1 + 8
3λ1) < 0.












6 (8λ1 + 3)(8λ1 − 3)) −1
16 ǫβ(8λ1 + 3)(8λ1 − 5)
−1








ǫβ(8λ1 + 3) + 3λ2
  −8
3 βλ2(−4ǫβλ2 + 3˜ τp) −ǫβ(4λ2
2 + (8λ1 + 3)˜ τp)
−ǫβ(4λ2





with h1 = 4ǫβ(8λ1+3)(8λ1−9)−3λ2(8λ1−1)2 and h2 = ǫβ{(8λ1+3)2˜ τp+8λ2(2λ2+α(8λ1+3))}+
12λ2(τp − (λ2 − α)2).












The question which control strategy will be chosen by the players, depends on the additional
objectives of the players. If they don’t have any additional objectives it seems reasonable that
ultimately the λi parameters are such that a Nash equilibrium occurs. That is, each player i tries to
maximize ˜ Ji w.r.t. λi, assuming a ﬁxed value for the other player. If, e.g., p0 = 0, this would result
in solving for the ranger the equation
∂H1(1,1)
∂λ1 = 0 and for the ﬁrm
∂H2(1,1)
∂λ2 = 0. This yields, with
˜ λ1 := 8λ1 − 1, the set of simultaneous equations
ǫβ(˜ λ1 + 4)
2 + 6λ2˜ λ1 = 0
8ǫβλ2(˜ λ1 + 4) + 12λ
2
2 − 3˜ τp(˜ λ1 + 4) = 0,
12under the (stability) constraint that ˜ λ1 > 0.
The solution of the above set of equations is given by λ2 = −
ǫβ(˜ λ1+4)2
6˜ λ1 where ˜ λ1 is the (unique)
positive solution of the equation
−3˜ λ
3




1 − 16˜ λ1 + 64 = 0.
Notice that in the limiting case, ǫ ↓ 0, this leads again to the solution λ1 = 1
8, λ2 = −
 
˜ τp.
From a robustness point of view another option could be that players like to choose the λi in such
a way that the closed-loop system becomes as stable as possible. Or, stated diﬀerently, to determine





















Fist notice that for ﬁxed λi, limǫ↓0 λ(λ1,λ2) = −4














ǫ . So, in case players would agree
to coordinate their actions, as far as it concerns the choice of the λi parameters, we see that this
largest eigenvalue can be made arbitrarily small by an appropriate choice of λi. A clear disadvantage
of this choice is that its implementation requires knowledge of ǫ. Furthermore, it easily results in
high gain feedbacks.





player’s 2 choice of λ2(< 0) is. Furthermore, λ(λ1,λ2) > −
β
4 if λ1 < −7




8 < λ1 <
−λ2
ǫβ(1+ 8
3). So, in case it is unclear what the value of ǫ will be and, moreover, the ranger
doesn’t know the ﬁrm’s choice of λ2 , the ranger can enforce always a certain stability of the closed-
loop system. In this case the ranger considers both the ﬁsh stock and the level of pollution in his
decision how much he should ﬁsh. This at the expense that he might have earned more proﬁts (for
small values of ǫ) or that, in retrospect, a more stabilizing control could have been implemented if
he would have known the ﬁrm’s action.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this note we considered the regular indeﬁnite inﬁnite-planning horizon linear-quadratic diﬀerential
game for index one descriptor systems. Both necessary conditions and suﬃcient conditions were
derived for the existence of a feedback Nash equilibrium. These conditions were stated in terms of
a transformed system. A complete parametrization was derived for the set of FBN equilibria. The
transformation used here was based on the Weierstrass canonical form. Notice, however, that for
numerical purposes it suﬃces to make a singular value decomposition of matrix E. Using this, one
can calculate then easily matrices Y and X yielding the same structural form (18), with matrix A1
a square matrix instead of a Jordan matrix (see [12, Remark 3.2]).
In case there exists a FBN equilibrium, usually, there exists an inﬁnite number of feedback Nash
equilibria which all give rise to the same closed-loop behavior of the system due to the informational
non-uniqueness of the problem. This makes it possible to look for equilibria within this set that satisfy
some additional properties, like e.g. robustness. We illustrated in an example how diﬀerent criteria
13may yield diﬀerent choices for the feedback design. In particular we showed that in this example one
of these equilibria can be interpreted as the converged FBN of the corresponding singular perturbed
system. By means of a counterexample (based on [16]) we showed that this property does not hold
for arbitrary systems. Furthermore we showed that in this example one of the players can enforce a
certain stability of the closed-loop system for the corresponding singularly perturbed system by an
appropriate choice of his strategy, this independent of the FBN strategy choice of the other player
and independent of the time-scale of the fast system. Clearly these observations ask for a more
detailed study in a more general setting.
The obtained theoretical results can be generalized straightforwardly to the N-player case. Fur-
thermore, since Qi are allowed to be indeﬁnite, the obtained results were used directly to derive
properties for the zero-sum game. We showed that in that case all FBN equilibria yield the same
closed-loop system.
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Appendix
Feedback Nash equilibria from game considered in (28) if ǫ  = 0.
First we rewrite this game into its standard form as
˙ x(t) = ˜ E
−1Ax(t) + ˜ E
−1B1u1(t) + ˜ E





































; and Rii = 1.
From, e.g. [9][Theorem 8.5], we recall that the feedback Nash equilibria ui(t) = Fix(t) for this




i Ki, i = 1,2, where (K1,K2) are a set of symmetric solutions of
the next coupled algebraic Riccati equations
0 = −( ˜ A − S2K2)
TK1 − K1( ˜ A − S2K2) + K1S1K1 − Q1, (32)
0 = −( ˜ A − S1K1)
TK2 − K2( ˜ A − S1K1) + K2S2K2 − Q2, (33)
that satisfy the additional requirement that the closed-loop system matrix Acl := ˜ A − S1K1 − S2K2




Moreover, the cost incurred by player i by playing this equilibrium action is xT







  ¯ k1 ¯ k2
¯ k2 ¯ k3
 
an elementary spelling of equations (32,33) yields
the next equations
14(k1 − β)



















) + (k2 + 1)(k1 − β) + β = 0
(k2 + 1)

















)¯ k2 = 0




2 + τp − α
2 = 0.
Introducing next r := k2 +1, s := α−
¯ k3
ǫ , v := k1 −β, ˜ τp := α2 −τp and ˜ τf := β2 −τf we can rewrite
the above set of equations as
v
2 + 2(r − 1)
¯ k2





(r − 1) + rv + β = 0 (35)
r
2 − 1 −
2s
ǫ




ǫ2 = 0 (37)
v¯ k2 + r¯ k1 −
s
ǫ
¯ k2 = 0 (38)
2r¯ k2 + s



















ǫ2 < 0. (40)
Now, ﬁrst consider the case v = 0. Then from (37) it follows that ¯ k2 = 0 and therefore the
eigenvalues of Acl are not stable. So this case does not provide an appropriate solution.
Next consider the case v  = 0. Then from (37) it follows that ¯ k1 = −
¯ k2
2
2vǫ2. From (38) it follows
next that either ¯ k2 = 0 or s = ǫv −
r¯ k2
2vǫ.
In case ¯ k2 = 0, it follows that ¯ k1 = 0 too, and (34-39) reduce to
v




(r − 1) + rv + β = 0 (42)
r
2 − 1 −
2s
ǫ
k3 = 0 (43)
s
2 − ˜ τp = 0. (44)
15Since the eigenvalues of Acl must be stable it follows that v =
 
˜ τf, s = −
 







2s(r2 − 1) is an appropriate solution provided the conditions ˜ τf > 0 and ˜ τp > 0 hold.
Next, consider the case that ¯ k1 = −
¯ k2
2
2vǫ2 and s = ǫv −
r¯ k2
2ǫv. Then, (34-39) reduce to
v
2 + 2(r − 1)
¯ k2





(r − 1) + rv + β = 0 (46)
r
2 − 1 −
2s
ǫ
k3 = 0 (47)
2r¯ k2 + s
2 − ˜ τp = 0. (48)
In case s = 0 it follows from (40) that v > 0 and r¯ k2 < 0, which violates the condition that
0 = s = ǫv −
r¯ k2
2ǫv. So, we may assume in the following s  = 0.
In case r = 1, by (47), necessarily k3 = 0. However, it is easily veriﬁed from (45) and (46) that the
case k3 = 0 does not provide an appropriate solution too.
So, w.l.o.g., we may assume that both r  = 1 and s  = 0. Now, introduce w := ǫv. By (47),
k3 =
ǫ(r2−1)
2s . Substitution into (46) gives:
0 =
¯ k2(r2 − 1)
2s





2 − 1) − 2s
2(r − 1) + 2s(rw + ǫβ)].
Substitution of, ﬁrst, s2 from (48) and, next, s = w −
r¯ k2
2w into the above expression yields then
¯ k2(4r
2 − (4 +
ǫβ
w
)r − 1) − 2˜ τp(r − 1) + 2w(rw + ǫβ) = 0.
From (45) it follows that ¯ k2 =
˜ τfǫ2−w2
2(r−1) . Substitution of ¯ k2 into the above equality and some




2 − (4w + ǫβ)r − w) − 4w(r − 1)
2˜ τp + 4(r − 1)w
2(rw + ǫβ) = 0.
Which can be rewritten as
w
3 + ǫβ(5r − 4)w
2 + (˜ τfǫ
2(4r
2 − 4r − 1) − 4˜ τp(r − 1)
2)w − ˜ τfǫ
3βr = 0. (49)










2r(3r − 4)˜ τfǫ2
16(r − 1)2 − ˜ τp = 0. (50)
So (45-48) has an appropriate solution iﬀ. (49,50) has a solution (r,w) satisfying the conditions i)
r¯ k2
2w > 0 and ii) w2 + 1
2r¯ k2 < 0, where ¯ k2 =
˜ τfǫ2−w2
2(r−1) .
16Case τf = β2
From the above reasoning it follows that the game has an equilibrium iﬀ. (49,50) has a solution (r,w)
satisfying the conditions i) and ii). Substitution of τf = β2 into this shows that the next conditions
should hold
w
3 + ǫβ(5r − 4)w
2 − 4˜ τp(r − 1)
2w = 0, (51)
(3r − 4)2
16(r − 1)2w
2 − ˜ τp = 0, (52)
where (r,w) has the properties that i)
r¯ k2
2w > 0 and ii) w2 + 1
2r¯ k2 < 0, with ¯ k2 = −w2
2(r−1).
From (52) it is clear that this set of equations has a solution only if ˜ τp ≥ 0. Since the conditions i)




|3r−4| , unless r = 4
3 and
˜ τp = 0.




2r¯ k2 = 0, which violates condition ii). So, if r =
4
3 there is no equilibrium.
Recall that v = 0 did not provide a solution. Therefore, w  = 0, and it follows from (51) that
w
2 + ǫβ(5r − 4)w − 4˜ τp(r − 1)






Moreover, i) and ii) hold iﬀ. 1 < r < 4
3.
Substitution of w2 into (53) gives after some elementary calculations that w also satisﬁes
w = 12
˜ τp(r − 1)2(r − 2)(3r − 2)
ǫβ(5r − 4)(3r − 4)2 . (54)
Combining (53) and (54) yields then after some elementary manipulations that r solves the equation
f(r) := 12
 
˜ τp(r − 1)(r − 2)(3r − 2) − 4ǫβ(5r − 4)(3r − 4) = 0. (55)
Notice that f(0) < 0, f(1) > 0 and f(
4
3) < 0. So there is precisely one solution of f(r) = 0 in the
interval 1 < r < 4
3.
So, summarizing, the game has no equilibrium if ˜ τp ≤ 0 and precisely one equilibrium iﬀ ˜ τp > 0. In
this lastmentioned case the parameters characterizing this equilibrium are (with r as deﬁned above):
- k1 = v + β = w














- ¯ k1 = −
¯ k2
2





- ¯ k2 = −8˜ τp
r−1
(3r−4)2









ǫ(3r−4) + β r − 1]x(t) and u2 =
−1







3r−4 − α]x(t), where x(t) satisﬁes the diﬀerential equation ˙ x(t) =
( ˜ A + ˜ B1F1 + ˜ B2F2)x(t), x(0) = x0.
17Notice that if ǫ ↓ 0, the appropriate solution of f(r) = 0 in (55) converges to r = 1. The
corresponding equilibrium actions converge then to u1 = [
−β
3 0]x(t) and u2 = [8
3β
 
˜ τp − (
 
˜ τp +
α)]x(t). The corresponding cost Ji = xT






revenues for the ranger are
β
3f2
0 and the cost for the ﬁrm 8
3β˜ τpf2
0.
Feedback Nash equilibria from game considered in (28) if ǫ = 0.
From (29) we have that either k2 = 0 or k2 = 2˜ τp(βα2 − k1). This gives rise to potentially three
diﬀerent equilibria.
Equilibrium 1: If k2 = 0 it follows from (29) that k1 = α2(β +
 
˜ τf), provided ˜ τf > 0. This
yields [ ˜ F1 ˜ F2] = [−α(β +
 
˜ τf) 0]; F1 = (β + ˜ √τf)[1 0] + λ1[0 1] and F2 = λ2[0 1], λ2  = −α. The
corresponding cost for the ranger is J1 = (
 
˜ τf + β)f2
0 and for the ﬁrm, J2 = 0.


























































This yields the equilibrium actions [ ˜ F1 ˜ F2] = [−α
3 (β +
 
β2 + 3τf), 2α2
3 (2β −
 
β2 + 3τf)] provided
−2β +
 












Case τf = β2
From the above reasoning it follows directly that for this case only equilibrium 2 applies. Substitution























β 1] and F2 = [0 − α] + λ2[
−8
3
β 1], where λi ∈ I R. (56)
Notice that this equilibrium coincides with the limiting case (ǫ ↓ 0) we studied before. Furthermore
the limiting equilibrium actions are obtained by choosing λ1 = 1
8 and λ2 = −
 
˜ τp.
Next consider the cost if one uses the equilibrium actions Fi from (56) to control system (24,25).
Then the system dynamics are described by


































18Notice that this system is stable iﬀ λ2 < 0 and
λ2


















3 (8λ1 − 1)
βλ1











3βλ2(λ2 − α) τp − (λ2 − α)2
 
.





, where Hi is the unique solution of the linear matrix equation
HiAǫ + A
T
ǫ Hi = −Wi.
Straightforward calculations show that
H1 =
1




6 (8λ1 + 3)(8λ1 − 3))
−1
16 ǫβ(8λ1 + 3)(8λ1 − 5)
−1








ǫβ(8λ1 + 3) + 3λ2
  −8
3 βλ2(−4ǫβλ2 + 3˜ τp) −ǫβ(4λ2
2 + (8λ1 + 3)˜ τp)
−ǫβ(4λ2





where h1 = 4ǫβ(8λ1 + 3)(8λ1 − 9) − 3λ2(8λ1 − 1)2 and h2 = ǫβ{(8λ1 + 3)2˜ τp + 8λ2(2λ2 + α(8λ1 +
3))} + 12λ2(τp − (λ2 − α)2).
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